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O P I N I O N* 
___________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
Reginald Braddy and his co-defendant Fontaine Horton were both found guilty of 
conspiracy to possess and distribute narcotics in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, and 
Horton was also found to be in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. Braddy and Horton 
appealed. The Defendants raise several issues: (1) both challenge the District Court’s 
denial of their motion to suppress wiretap evidence; (2) Braddy argues that the District 
Court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial; (3) Braddy also argues that the District 
Court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; and (4) both Defendants 
challenge the sentences imposed by the District Court. We will affirm all of the District 
Court’s orders.1 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Braddy and Horton were indicted for conspiracy to traffic methamphetamine, 
cocaine, and heroin. A1120-23. Each pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial.  
Prior to trial, the Defendants filed a joint motion to suppress evidence obtained 
through court-approved wiretaps. They argued that the Government’s wiretap 
applications failed to show that traditional investigative methods “ha[d] been tried and 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 We possess jurisdiction over this appeal from a final district court order pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
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have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed,” as required by 18 U.S.C. § 
2518(3)(c). A1124-30. They also argued that they were entitled to a Franks hearing to 
determine whether the wiretap warrants were based on false statements by law 
enforcement. A1132-46. The Distirct Court rejected both arguments and denied the 
motion to suppress. A18. 
At trial, three confidential informants testified that they had purchased various 
types of drugs from Braddy and Horton and that the two Defendants worked together to 
ship, distribute, collect payment for, and “cut” the drugs for resale.2 The Government also 
introduced evidence of Braddy and Horton’s frequent phone and text conversations 
regarding their trafficking activities. A183. 
At one point during the trial, the following exchange took place during defense 
counsel’s cross-examination of Michael Sciarillo, a law enforcement officer involved in 
the investigation: 
Q: And what is the code word for crystal meth? 
A: Ice, ugly, rocket fuel, racing fuel, glass, slippers. 
                                              
2  Informant One testified that he had met Horton through Braddy’s uncle. A221. He 
also testified that sometimes when he purchased drugs from Horton, Horton told him to 
send money to Braddy’s California address instead of paying Horton directly. A272.  
Informant Two testified that Braddy sent Horton packages of drugs. A344-46. He 
testified that Horton facilitated a phone conversation where Braddy told the informant 
how to “cut” large quantities of drugs for resale. A337. He also testified that Horton and 
Braddy “cut” drugs together, and that Horton allowed the informant to use his car to sell 
drugs. A338-40.   
Informant Three testified that Braddy introduced him to Horton after the informant 
told Braddy he wanted to purchase drugs from him. A447. Braddy sent Horton to the 
informant’s home to carry out the sale. A447. He testified that sometimes Braddy told 
him to pay Horton directly, and sometimes he told him to send payment to Braddy in 
California. A448.  
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Q: Would you agree with me of any of the documents you went through 
that other than the one document . . . there’s no mention of any of those 
code words? 
A: There’s mention in text message and various mentions in the audio, 
which we will play. 
Q: Would you identify the other one—other than that one? 
A: What do you want me to identify? 
Q: Other than that one, the one thing you went through -- 
A: Yes 
Q: -- I want you [to] identify there are crystal meth code words other than 
the one space where it talks about ugly. 
A: Actually I believe I am incorrect.  That exhibit will be presented by 
another witness, not me.  So for that exhibit, yes, you’re correct. 
A423-24. Following this exchange, defense counsel moved to strike Sciarillo’s 
testimony and declare a mistrial, citing “testimony of what another witness is  
going to say.” A424.  The District Court denied the motion for mistrial. A424. 
Following the Government’s presentation of evidence, the Defendants moved for a 
judgment of acquittal, arguing that the Government had failed to prove a conspiracy.  
A544–55.  The District Court denied the motion, and the jury returned a guilty verdict. 
A546. 
 Horton and Braddy were sentenced to 188-225 and 235-240 months in prison, 
respectively, based on the District Court’s conclusion that the offense involved at least 
18,265 kg. of drugs. A22. Horton objected, arguing that he should only be responsible for 
the quantity of drugs he personally possessed or sold. A23. The District Court rejected 




A. Wiretap Evidence 
The Defendants argue that the District Court erred in admitting wiretap evidence 
because the Government’s wiretap application did not meet the requirements of 18 
U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c). They also argue that the District Court erred in refusing to grant 
them a Franks hearing to determine whether the wiretaps were obtained through false 
statements. We will not disturb these rulings.  
1.  Motion to Suppress Wiretap Evidence3 
18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) requires a wiretap applicant to show that “normal 
investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be 
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” The Defendants argue that the 
wiretap applications did not meet this requirement because, using traditional investigative 
techniques, the Government had already obtained sufficient evidence to charge them with 
the crime. Specifically, it already had identified several members of the conspiracy, 
determined the source of some of the drugs, and obtained financial information about 
Braddy.  
However, the Defendants misconstrue § 2518(3)(c)’s requirement. As the District 
Court correctly noted, even where traditional investigative techniques may be sufficient 
to implicate some members of a conspiracy, wiretaps are permissible if necessary to 
uncover the full scope of the conspiracy.  See United States v. Bailey, 840 F.3d 99, 114–
                                              
3 This Court reviews the denial of a motion to suppress “for clear error as to the 
underlying facts, but exercise[s] plenary review as to its legality.”  United States v. 
Jackson, 849 F.3d 540, 544 (3d Cir. 2017).   
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15 (3d Cir. 2016) (“As we have previously explained, even where ‘normal investigative 
techniques might have been sufficient to implicate’ the conspiracy leader in drug 
trafficking, ‘such approaches’ are sometimes insufficient to determine ‘the scope of the 
conspiracy or the nature of [the conspiracy leader's] on-going criminal activity.’ Instead, 
‘[i]n the proper circumstances, the instrumentalities of Title III may be employed to 
discover the full extent of crimes and conspiracies.’” (quoting United States v. Vento, 533 
F.2d, 838, 850 (3d Cir. 1976)). When determining whether a wiretap is necessary to 
uncover the full scope of a conspiracy, a court “may properly take into account 
affirmations which are founded in part upon the experience of specifically trained 
agents.” United States v. Williams, 124 F.3d 411, 418 (3d Cir. 1997).    
The District Court did not err in concluding that wiretaps were necessary to learn 
the full scope of the drug trafficking conspiracy. The law enforcement affidavits 
submitted in support of the wiretap applications described in detail the traditional 
investigative techniques used. They explained that these techniques had failed to reveal 
the full scope of the conspiracy, including all the participants, suppliers, customers, and 
storage locations involved. They also described the various traditional techniques not 
employed—including undercover officers, grand jury subpoenas, search warrants, 
interviews, and mail covers—and why those techniques would have been ineffective or 
even dangerous. The District Court thus properly concluded that wiretaps were necessary 




2. Failure to Grant a Franks Hearing4 
In certain circumstances, a criminal defendant has the right to an evidentiary 
hearing to determine whether a search warrant was based on a false statement. Franks v. 
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978). According to the Defendants, two pairs of 
contradictory law enforcement statements entitled them to a Franks hearing.5 First, 
according to a law enforcement report, in October 2013 Informant Two told law 
enforcement officers that he obtained drugs from Horton and that he knew Horton 
obtained drugs from Braddy. Braddy Br. at 21. But, according to the January 2014 
wiretap application, “while [Informant Two] previously identified Horton as being his 
source for narcotics, [Informant Two] is a relatively low ‘street-level’ drug dealer and is 
not familiar with other members of Horton’s organization or with Horton’s source(s) of 
supply.” Id. Second, according to the same affidavit, “investigators do not know the 
location where Fontaine Horton received his mail” and “have not yet identified any bank 
accounts and/or assets potentially owned or utilized by Horton’s drug trafficking 
organization.”  Id.  However, other documents show that they were aware of at least one 
bank account and several addresses associated with Braddy by late 2013.  
In order to obtain a Franks hearing, a defendant must make “a substantial 
preliminary showing” that (1) the warrant was based on a statement that was knowingly 
                                              
4 The standard of review applied to a district court’s denial of a Franks hearing is an open 
question in the Third Circuit. See United States v. Pavulak, 700 F.3d 651, 665 (3d Cir. 
2012) (“We have not yet identified the standard of review for a district court’s denial of a 
request for a Franks hearing”). We need not resolve this question here because the 
District Court’s decision withstands even de novo review. 
5 For purposes of this decision only, we assume Franks applies to wiretap applications. 
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and intentionally false or made with reckless regard for the truth, and (2) the allegedly 
false statement was necessary to the finding of probable cause. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-
56.  “[T]he defendant cannot rest on mere conclusory allegations.” United States v. Yusuf, 
461 F.3d 374, 383 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006).   
We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that the Defendants failed to make 
the required preliminary showing. Although some of the statements in the affidavits were 
inconsistent with statements found in other documents, the Defendants’ bare allegations 
do not support a finding that any false statements were made knowingly and intentionally 
or with reckless disregard for the truth. Nor have they shown that any of the allegedly 
false statements were necessary to the court’s probable cause determination. The 
Defendants were therefore not entitled to a Franks hearing.  
B. Braddy’s Motion for Mistrial 
The District Court did not err in denying Braddy’s motion for mistrial following 
Sciarillo’s testimony.6 Braddy argues that Sciarillo’s incorrect statement that he would 
present an exhibit providing the code words for methamphetamine—which he himself 
then corrected—was purposefully made in order to negate cross-examination and bolster 
a future witness. Braddy relies exclusively and incorrectly on United States v. Boyce, 849 
F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1988). In Boyce, following cross-examination of a Government witness 
regarding her failure to produce several pieces of physical evidence, the prosecutor 
turned to the jury and declared that he would “be happy” to produce the evidence himself. 
                                              
6 A district court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial in such a situation is subject to abuse 
of discretion and harmless error analysis.  See United States v. Vitillo, 490 F.3d 314, 325 
(3d Cir. 2007).   
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Id. at 837-38. The Boyce court rejected this “bald attempt to undercut the defense’s cross-
examination and vouch for the credibility of his own witness.” Id. But here, the 
Government did not attempt to correct Sciarillo’s testimony or bolster his credibility by 
directly addressing the jury. In fact, the Government did not speak at all following this 
exhange. Boyce is thus inapposite, and the District Court properly denied Braddy’s 
motion for a mistrial.   
C. Braddy’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal 
The District Court properly denied Braddy’s motion for a judgment of acquittal. A 
reviewing court must uphold a conviction “if any rational trier of fact could have found 
the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.”  United States v. Gibbs, 
190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).  To prove a drug-trafficking conspiracy under 
21 U.S.C. § 846, “the government must establish: (1) a shared unity of purpose between 
the alleged conspirators, (2) an intent to achieve a common goal, and (3) an agreement to 
work together to that goal.”  United States v. Bailey, 840 F.3d 99, 108 (3d Cir. 2016). A 
simple buyer-seller relationship is not sufficient. Id.  
Braddy argues that he merely had a buyer-seller relationship with his alleged co-
conspirators. Braddy Br. at 16. However, there was sufficient evidence to allow a 
reasonable jury to conclude that Braddy at least one other person—Horton—“worked 
together” with a “shared unity of purpose” to achieve a “common goal” of distributing 
drugs. Trial testimony established that for at least one year, Braddy and Horton worked 
together to ship, distribute, and collect payment for various types of drugs. A177, A183, 
A394, A396, A399-401. Together they “cut” large quantities of drugs for resale. A338-
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39. They communicated regularly about their criminal activities. A183. Horton himself 
testified that he obtained $38,500 from one of the confidential informants and sent 
Braddy the money via mail. A615–17. Given this and the other evidence introduced at 
trial, the District Court properly denied Braddy’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.   
D. Defendants’ Sentencing Challenges 
Finally, Horton and Braddy challenge the sentences imposed by the District Court. 
Horton argues that the District Court should have calculated his sentence based the 
amount of drugs he personally trafficked, not the amount of drugs involved in the 
conspiracy as a whole. Horton Br. 20-22. He also suggests that the District Court 
erroneously relied on the informants’ trial testimony to determine the quantity of drugs 
attributable to him. Horton Br. 22.  Braddy argues that his sentence is substantively 
unreasonable because it is greater than the sentences imposed on other members of the 
conspiracy. Braddy Br. 25-26. We affirm both sentences. 
1. Horton’s Sentence7   
The District Court did not err in holding Horton responsible for the entire quantity 
of drugs trafficked as part of the conspiracy. A “defendant is accountable for all 
quantities of contraband with which he was directly involved and, in the case of a jointly 
undertaken criminal activity, all reasonably foreseeable quantities of contraband that 
were within the scope of the criminal activity that he jointly undertook.” United States v. 
                                              
7 “We review for clear error the District Court’s findings of facts regarding the relevant 
quantities of drugs attributable to the defendant.”  United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 319, 
352 (3d Cir. 2002).   
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Perez, 280 F. 3d 318, 253 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.2).8 Here, 
there was abundant evidence that Horton was involved in an ongoing joint undertaking to 
distribute large quantities of drugs with Braddy, and that the quantity of drugs attributed 
to him was reasonably foreseeable and within the scope of that undertaking.  Braddy 
obtained large quantities of drugs and sent them to Horton in Pennsylvania for 
distribution. A344-46.  Horton and Braddy worked together to distribute the drugs, obtain 
payment, and funnel the money back to California. A344-46, A337-39, A447, A448, 
A458-74. Together they “cut” large quantities of drugs for resale and instructed others 
how to do so as well. A337-40. Given this and other evidence introduced at trial, the 
District Court did not clearly err in concluding that the entire quantity of narcotics 
distributed as part of the conspiracy was reasonably foreseeable and within the scope of 
the jointly undertaken criminal activity.  
We also reject Horton’s argument that the District Court improperly relied on 
“unreliable witnesses” to determine the quantity of drugs attributable to Horton. Horton 
Br. 23. Evidence used as a basis for sentencing under the guidelines must “have sufficient 
indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.”  United States v. Freeman, 763 
F.3d 322, 337 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation omitted). “Indicia of reliability may 
come from, inter alia, the provision of facts and details, corroboration by or consistency 
with other evidence or the opportunity for cross-examination.” Id.  To the extent that a 
                                              
8 Perez cites the Sentencing Guidelines as amended in 2001. As of 2015, a substantively 
identical, but slightly modified, version can be found at U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.3. 
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district court’s findings are based on credibility determinations, we give “even greater 
deference to [its] findings.” United States v. Beckett, 208 F.3d 140, 148 (3d Cir. 2000).  
The District Court did not err in relying on the informants’ testimony. Their 
testimony had several indicia of reliability. They were consistent with one another in 
terms of the price charged for particular types and amounts of drugs, the method of 
distribution and payment, and the relationship between Braddy and Horton. A29–33.  
Phone records and law enforcement testimony also corroborated the informants’ 
testimony. A177, A183, A394, A396, A399-401. The District Court also made a general 
finding of credibility based on its observations from trial. A29. Given these indicia of 
reliability, and the deference afforded the District Court’s credibility determinations, it 
did not err in relying on the informants’ testimony.    
B. Braddy’s Sentence9   
 Braddy’s 235-month sentence was not substantively unreasonable. Where, as here, 
a defendant does not allege any procedural error in calculating his sentence, a sentence is 
presumed reasonable “unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the 
same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the [D]istrict [C]ourt 
provided.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009). Based on the 
quantity of drugs attributable to him, Braddy’s base offense level was 34. A22. This was 
increased by two levels for his leadership role in the conspiracy, and another two levels 
for obstruction of justice. A22. This adjusted base offense level of 38, combined with his 
                                              
9 When a defendant challenges the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we review 
the sentence for abuse of discretion.  Freeman, 763 F.3d at 335. 
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criminal history resulted in a Sentencing Guideline range of 235-293 months. A22. This 
was reduced to 235-240 months because of the statutory cap of twenty years. A34. This 
sentence complied with the Sentencing Guidelines and relevant statutory law, and we 
cannot say that no reasonable court would have imposed the same sentence.   
 Braddy suggests that his sentence is unreasonable because he received a longer 
sentence than his co-conspirators. However, “a criminal defendant has no constitutional 
right to be given a sentence equal in duration to that of his or her co-defendants.” United 
States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 379 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation omitted). Braddy 
points out that his co-conspirator Borushak was sentenced to 18 months, and Horton was 
sentenced to 188 months. Braddy Br. 25-26. However, the quantity of narcotics 
attributable to Borushak was much less than that attributable to Braddy. And Horton was 
not subjected to a two-level increase in his base offense level because, unlike Braddy, he 
was not an “organizer and leader” of the conspiracy. A22. Given the evidence at trial to 
this effect, we cannot say that this two-level increase was an abuse of discretion. We 
therefore affirm the District Court’s sentencing decision.  
III. CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, we will affirm the Orders of the District Court. 
